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At Mineta San Jose International, frequent flyers increasingly rely
on the Clear system for speedy passage through security checkpoints. In
New York, cutting edge technology is used to track city employees when
they enter or exit the workplace. Consumers in Indiana pay for their gro-
ceries with similar technology and throughout the country, school
districts are utilizing recent advances to allow students to pay for lunch,
track school buses and parent volunteers and check out library books.
Biometrics are not just our future, they are our present. In the wake of
9/11, interest in using biometrics for identity verification has increased.
Biometric systems measure physical or behavioral characteristics to
identify a person. Particular interest has focused on the areas of visa and
* J.D., expected May 2007, the University of Michigan Law School; B.A., English,
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immigration documentation and government-issued identification card
programs. Biometrics are appealing to security experts because they are
closely bound to an individual, are supposedly more reliable, and are
difficult to forget, lose, or falsify.
The biometric identifier relies on an individual's unique biological
information such as a hand, iris, fingerprint, facial or voice print. When
used for verification purposes, a "one-to-one" match is generated in un-
der one second. Biometric technology can substantially improve national
security by identifying and verifying individuals in a number of different
contexts, providing security in ways that exceed current identification
technology and limiting access to areas where security breaches are es-
pecially high, such as airport tarmacs and critical infrastructure facilities.
At the same time, a legitimate public concern exists concerning the mis-
use of biometric technology to invade or violate personal privacy.
I. WHAT Is BIOMETICS?
A. Finger Prints
Biometrics is the measuring of physical or behavioral characteristics
to verify a person's identity.' As John Moore notes in "Sensing the Fu-
ture of Security", fingerprints are the "oldest and most widely used
biometric identifier.' 2 Once the image is scanned, it is scoured for unique
features and stored as a mathematical template. Next, a matching algo-
rithm is stored to compare the template with subsequent fingerprint
scans. Law enforcement officials rely upon a score indicating the close-
ness of the presented biometric to the stored template using the help of a
predefined number or algorithm to determine whether the images are
sufficiently close enough to be considered a match. There are two forms
of fingerprint scans:
The first is an automated fingerprint identification system where re-
sponses are generated in minutes. With this method, police conduct a
search using an arrestee's fingerprint or a latent print collected at a crime
scene against a fingerprint database. One example of this method is the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Integrated Automated Finger-
print Identification System (IAFIS), which is a national fingerprint and
1. John Moore, The E-Gov Institute, Sensing the Future of Security, June 23, 2003,
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0623/cov-reportl -06-23-03.asp.
2. Id.
criminal history database.' It is the largest ten print system in the
world .4
The second system is a finger scan. The scan creates an initial tem-
plate that is then compared against subsequent scans. This method
authenticates a person's identity and can be used to control access to fa-
cilities, computer networks, and individual computing devices.
In the 1990s, fingerprints were the standard used by law enforce-
ment officials. Much of the attention was given to shifting from ink and
paper to livescan and electronic submissions. Government funding fo-
cused on aiding law enforcement and border control agencies. Today,
there is some concern that manual laborers, those with worn finger pads,
individuals born with unreadable fingerprints, and those with unusually
dry or moist hands will not be able to participate in automated finger-
printing and scanning systems.6
B. Facial Recognition
Facial recognition systems rely on images captured from video and
digital photos and compare the captured image to those stored in a data-
base. Currently, such systems are being used to locate missing children,
limit passport fraud, and combat identity theft.7 There are two ap-
proaches used for facial recognition: feature-based and view-based
systems.8 Again, the images are converted to templates and local feature
analysis generates a faceprint. The characteristics of a face (eigenfaces
or principal components) are translated into a unique set of numbers us-
ing the eigenface method. However, many different algorithms are
generated using the various recognition systems. The three most preva-
lent ones are: principal components analysis (PCA), Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA) and Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM). The PCA
3. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CJIS Division, Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last visited March 8, 2007).
4. ROBERT F. DIEGELMAN, LOCKHEED MARTIN, LOCKHEED MARTIN




6. Those who are studying biometric modalities and their various applications recog-
nize that one weakness of using fingerprint-based identification verification methods is that
such systems will not detect the unique features of a manual laborer's fingerprints due to their
worn finger pads, affecting their reliability. Ideally, any biometric system would allow for the
universal enrollment of every member of society. PERSONAL VERIFICATION USING PALMPRINT
AND HAND GEOMETRY BIOMETRIC, at 1, http:/Ibiometrics.cse.msu.edu/Publications/Multi-
biometrics/KumaretalPalmprintHandFusionAVBPA2003.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
7. COMM. ON TECH., NAT'L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, FACE RECOGNITION, at 2,
http:llwww.biometrics.gov/Docs/facerec.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
8. Id.
BiometricsSpring 2007]
544 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:541
method uses eigenfaces to decompose facial structure. The LDA method
is a statistical approach and classifies samples of unknown classes, based
upon training samples, with known classes.9 The goal of this method is
to maximize between-class variance (i.e. cross users) and minimize
within-class (i.e. within user) variance. Using the EBGM approach, the
face is transposed onto an elastic grid. A Gabor filter is used to detect
shapes and extract features using image processing and recognition is
based on the similarity of the Gabor filter response at each Gabor node. "
One benefit of this biometric system is that it can be used for both identi-
fication and verification purposes and can compare live and static images
with stored images. However, factors including lighting, expression, and
pose can alter the accuracy of these methods.
C. Hand Geometry
Similar to fingerprint and facial recognition systems, hand geometry
measures characteristics such as length, width, and surface area to de-
velop a template of an individual's hand." To capture these features the
hand is scanned using a digital camera. Typically three images of the
hand are taken and then evaluated and measured to create a template.
When an individual's identity must be verified, the template associated
with that person is recalled and the hand is again placed on a plate where
the image is taken and a verification template is created.'2 The two tem-
plates are then compared and a similarity score is produced and either
accepted or rejected, depending on the threshold previously established. 3
Although it can easily be integrated with other biometric modalities,
its use is limited to identity verification only, as a result of its limited
accuracy.'4 Another downside is the system's inability to distinguish be-
tween a "living" hand and a "non-living" hand, another rationale for
limiting the use of such systems to medium-security locales. In addition
to identity verification, this system is used to monitor attendance, and
restrict physical access. Despite these drawbacks, such systems are gen-
erally deemed more acceptable in the eyes of the public since hand scans
are perceived as being less invasive.
9. Id.
10. A Gabor node is a node on the elastic grid that describes the image behavior around
a given pixel. See COMM. ON TECH., supra note 7, at 4 fig. 4.
11. See generally COMM. ON TECH., NAT'L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, HAND GEOME-
TRY, http://www.biometrics.gov/Docs/handgeometry.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. CTRS. FOR UNIFIED BIOMETRICS AND SENSORS, UNIV. AT BUFFALO, HAND GEOME-




Iris recognition and retinal scanning are the traditional approaches
for eye-based biometrics. Iris recognition captures an image of the iris
and stores a record of the iris pattern. This automated system is fairly
new and government officials are eager to use this system due in large
part to the fact that the details of iris patterns are unique.'5 With this
method, the iris is located using landmark features. One difficulty asso-
ciated with this system is the disruption caused by pupils, eyelashes,
eyelids, and reflections, which can alter the image.' 6 Today, high quality
digital cameras using infrared light to isolate the iris are used. The iris is
then divided into vectors using a 2D Gabor wavelet that filters and maps
the segments of the iris. The information that is recorded includes orien-
tation and spatial frequency and the position of these areas. 7 Once this
data is collected, an IrisCode is used to describe the patterns detected
and two IrisCodes are compared in order to verify an individual's iden-
tity. The difference between the codes is labeled "Hamming Distance,"
which measures the dissimilarity between two irises. When two different
irises are compared, they are statistically guaranteed to pass the test of
statistical independence. However, iris recognition is based upon the
failure of this test. "Failure" occurs when less than one third of the bytes
in the codes differ. When images of the same iris are compared, they fail
the test. Hence, a score of zero would indicate a perfect match. Glasses,
contacts, and many new forms of eye surgery do not interfere with the
ability to capture an accurate image of the iris. Nor are the blind ex-
cluded from iris recognition.
Retinal scanning identifies an individual based upon the pattern of
blood vessels on their retina. Like iris recognition, a high quality digital
camera must be used to capture the images. However, there is some con-
cern that the retina becomes altered with age. Despite this concern,
retinal scanning is widely used to restrict access to high-security areas.
These systems are used by the CIA, FBI, and NASA.'8 User acceptance
will be the greatest hurdle government officials will face if they opt to
implement these systems on a nationwide scale.
15. COMM. ON TECH., NAT'L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, IRIS RECOGNITION, http://
www.biometrics.gov/Docs/irisrec.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Iris and Retinal Identification, http://et.wcu.edu/aidc/BioWebPages/Biometrics-
Eye.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
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II. WHY USE BIOMETRICS?
A. Increased Globalization
Most proponents of biometric modalities cite national security needs
in defense of biometrics in light of the fact that illegal immigration and
terrorism have become a significant concern.' 9 Intertwined with these
concerns are international travel and trade considerations. Biometric sys-
tems offer a unique solution by aiding government officials (and
businesses) in determining who to include and who to exclude with
speed, accuracy and convenience. Such systems allow society to draw
the delicate balance between national security and international com-
merce. Moreover, when compared to a cavity search or police
interrogation, the nationwide application of biometrics is appealing in
that most methods are unintrusive (i.e. finger and hand scans) and do not
stray far from the identity verification practices with which we have
grown accustomed. In a world where obtaining false documents and
identification is only a click away, biometrics offer a pricey, yet attrac-
tive, alternative- identification and verification with a higher degree of
certainty than current practices.
What makes these systems so useful is their ability to conduct one-
to-many matches in large databases. For example, high-end automated
fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) are highly accurate, scanning
ten fingers with flat or rolled impressing and boasting failure-to-match
and false match rates close to zero, depending on the matching algorithm
used. They simply add physical and/or behavioral characteristics to iden-
tity information. The US-VISIT system adopted by the Department of
Homeland Security captures and stores data concerning those entering
the country.2° Fingers are scanned and a digital photograph is taken in
order to verify individuals before allowing them into the country.2' The
same is true of modalities used for verification purposes; except, instead
of tracking criminals, biometrics can allow or restrict anyone's access to
sensitive areas, as needed.
B. The Dangers of the Internet
Biometric systems can also combat phishing and identity fraud, the
fastest growing crime problem in the United States. By using physical
19. ACCENTURE, THE FUTURE OF IDENTITY: BIOMETRICS SOLUTIONS TO ENHANCE THE
PERFORMANCE OF BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENTS 2 (2005), http://www.accenture.com/NR/
rdonlyres/3919AFI E-2414-4E73-92AB-74FC 1911281E/0/futureidentity.pdf.
20. Ed Frauenheim, Accenture Lands Homeland Security Deal, June 1, 2004, http://
news.com.com/Accenture+lands+Homeland+Security+deal/2100-1029_3-5223851 .html.
21. Id.
identifiers, individuals do not need to deal with the expense and time-
consuming nature of clearing their name if their identity is stolen. Rather
than memorizing several different passwords, with a scan of one's finger,
22access to bank accounts and other private data can be achieved . Recog-
nizing the commercial benefit of this technology, stores such as
CompUSA are selling mice with finger scanning technology to restrict
access to one's computer files. Yet, what will likely become more com-
mon are methods such as the one adopted by the Albertson's grocery
store chain. The store allows customers to register their fingerprints and
bank accounts with a third party service such as BioPay or Pay By Touch
and permits them simply to scan their finger rather than using a credit
card.23 Similarly, some computer manufacturers sell laptops with a fin-
gerprint scanning capability, allowing online shoppers to pay by
scanning their finger, rather than inputting credit card information.
III. THE RISKS OF BIOMETRICS
Biometric modalities present legal questions that cannot be left for
future generations to resolve. Since these systems are becoming more
prevalent in numerous sectors throughout American society, the prob-
lems and challenges faced by personal identification and verification
using physical characteristics must be addressed today. The central ques-
tion is how government and law enforcement officials can adapt these
techniques to protect an individual's privacy while achieving legitimate
objectives.
If fingerprinting and drug testing are considered "searches" under
the Fourth Amendment, one must ask if taking one's biological data
through a biometric modality also constitutes a search.25 It is clear from
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States that the
Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places.26 In Katz, the
Court held that Katz's expectation of privacy in a phone booth was
22. ACCENTURE, THE FUTURE OF IDENTITY: BIOMETRICS SOLUTIONS TO ENHANCE THE
PERFORMANCE OF BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENTS, (2005), http://www.accenture.com/NR/
rdonlyres/3919AF1 E-2414-4E73-92AB-74FC 1911281E/O/future_identity.pdf.
23. Grace Wong, Cash or plastic? How about fingerprint?, July 20, 2005, http://
money.cnn.com/2005/O7/19/pf/security-.biometrics/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
24. Id.
25. KENNETH P. NUGER, NAT'L BIOMETRIC TEST CTR., SAN JOSE STATE UNIV., BIO-
METRIC APPLICATIONS: LEGAL AND SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS, http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/
biometrics/publicationsconsideration.htmI (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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unreasonable." Notwithstanding the Court's decision, while reasonable
minds could differ regarding the reasonableness of one's expectation of
privacy when engaging in a telephone conversation in a closed telephone
booth, when considering the characteristics of an individual's hand or
iris, the answer seems much more straightforward. Few would argue that
an individual's subjective expectation of privacy in their fingerprints,
iris, and retina is not socially recognized as reasonable." Accordingly, a
Fourth Amendment challenge to the use of biometrics would likely be
upheld.
A. Technological Advances and the Shrinking Right to Privacy
However, this perfunctory answer is somewhat unsatisfying, and for
good reason. Changing social expectations of privacy influence Fourth
Amendment rights.2 9 As Steven Goldberg notes, the realm of privacy
shrinks as technology develops. 0 Had thermal imaging devices been
more prevalent at the time of the Kyllo decision, the Supreme Court
would likely have reached a different result.3' We now live in a society
where biometric systems are used to pay for groceries, check out library
books, gain entrance to private gyms, and speed through airport security.
Such issues warrant the conclusion that biometric technology is in the
"general public use."32 This technology can hardly be labeled crude or
primitive and has slowly become a part of everyday life for a segment of
the general population. If we accept this as true, how can we reconcile
limited Fourth Amendment protections with an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy?
B. Biometrics As Applied to Terry Stops
Of critical importance is the context in which biometric modalities
are used. At the outset, it is important to recognize that the United States
government is focusing its attention on applying biometrics to border
27. In Katz, the defendant was suspected of transmitting wagering information and the
police recorded his end of the conversations by attaching a listening device to a phone booth
without obtaining a warrant.
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
30. Steven Goldberg, Enhancing The Senses: How Technological Advances Shape Our
View of the Law, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2006).
31. Kyllo was suspected of growing marijuana in his home. Federal agents used ther-
mal imagers to scan the roof and side of his apartment building. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that obtaining information regarding the interior of the home by sense-enhancing technology
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area constitutes a search where the technology in question isn't in the general public
use. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
32. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
security to identify and reject known (and suspected) terrorists and other
individuals viewed as a "threat" to national security. Consequently, chal-
lenges to the use of biometric technology will likely occur in the
criminal context and this Note focuses on biometric technology in this
setting. Since this technology can only be used for identification and
verification purposes, the questions this Note raises will most often ap-
ply where police officers briefly detain individuals for investigation. The
question then becomes, how can courts balance the needs of law en-
forcement officials against the individual's right to privacy in a criminal
setting? State v. Flynn3 - provides an example of when biometrics would
most likely give rise to Fourth Amendment concerns. There, two sus-
pects were stopped for investigation of a recent burglary and one refused
to identify himself, although he admitted to carrying identification in his
wallet. The officer removed his wallet and radioed in the suspect's name
and was told that the suspect was wanted for an earlier crime. The court
held that preventing an officer from ascertaining a suspect's identity
would render a stop useless and noted that the search was a limited one
that the suspect could have avoided by providing his identification. A
biometric system would replace the use of a radio in this example with
the same or a lesser degree of intrusiveness.
However, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. In Peo-
ple v. Williams, a Michigan court ruled the act of looking through the
suspect's wallet a violation of the Fourth Amendment, despite the offi-
cer's belief that the suspect was lying when he stated that he had no
identification. 34 Although both Flynn, a Wisconsin case, and Williams, a
Michigan case, involved lawful stops, opposite conclusions were
reached. With biometric systems, it is likely that most of the resulting
detentions would be characterized as lawful stops due to the fact that
only those individuals who are a match in the system would be detained
(i.e. those with a criminal history). Currently, IAFIS, the database used
by the FBI, only contains the fingerprints of individuals with a corre-
sponding criminal history. Similarly, suspected terrorists and other
individuals with restricted access to high-security areas could be de-
tained because their hand or eye scan yields a "hit" in a criminal history
(or suspected terrorist) database linked to a biometric database and fur-
ther investigation is needed. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court
provides another useful example. There, the U.S. Supreme Court used
Terry balancing to hold that the request for identity has an immediate
33. State v. Flynn, 285 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 1979).
34. People v. Williams, 234 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. App. 1975).
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relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.35
The Court further held that the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure
that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity; and that
such threat does not alter the nature of the stop itself provided that the
request for identification was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the stop.
36
These cases are all instructive but precious few involve technology
similar to that used in biometric modalities. Perhaps most informative is
United States v. Dionisio, where a group of witnesses were subpoenaed
to appear before a grand jury and provide voice prints. There, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated and that no prelimi-
nary showing of probable cause or reasonableness was required in such a
case. What is relevant is the Court's discussion of the voice print re-
quirement:
the requirement that the witness give exemplars does not in-
fringe upon Fourth Amendment rights, as 'the physical
characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as op-
posed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly
exposed to the public,' so that 'no person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice.37
The Court's rationale does not support the conclusion that one's expecta-
tion of privacy in their physical and behavioral characteristics must
always be upheld. In theory, one's fingerprints, eyes, and handprints are
always on display. Moreover, even if individuals are more cautious with
regard to consenting to fingerprinting, the law offers little protection
when certain conditions are present. In Hayes v. Florida,38 fingerprinting
was deemed permissible if three requirements are satisfied: there is rea-
sonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act; a
reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting would establish or ne-
gate the suspect's connection with that crime; and the procedure is
carried out with dispatch.39 But in Davis v. Mississippi, the Court cau-
tioned that detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are
35. A Terry stop occurs when a police officer detains an individual on reasonable suspi-
cion that they have or about to commit a crime. It is not considered an arrest. The officer may
temporarily detain the person to request identification and question them regarding the sus-
pected criminal activity.
36. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
37. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
38. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
39. Id.
no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 4° However,
the Court noted that in narrowly defined circumstances, the fingerprint-
ing process could be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even
though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense. The Court
concluded that fingerprinting is less intrusive, inherently more reliable in
solving crime, and not susceptible to the same weaknesses as an im-
proper lineup. How can the use of biometrics be limited when probable
cause is not required?
C. Adapting Biometric Systems to Meet Fourth
Amendment Requirements
Biometric modalities if properly tailored can satisfy the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of probable cause.
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to the
officer are sufficient to warrant suspicion that a crime was committed
and that the person being detained committed that offense.' However,
where an arrest warrant is not required, probable cause is not necessary;
instead, the search must simply be reasonable. From an objective point
of view, a fingerprint or facial scan as compared to a cavity search or
"frisk," biometric technology seems minimally invasive, at best. Some
might even prefer to have a finger scanned if it can resolve questions of
identity more efficiently. As more and more people begin to scan their
fingers (or hand, iris, etc) to enter their local gym or pay for groceries,
the more common these biometric systems become. Given the level of
comfort the public is displaying with regard to this technology, public
reaction warrants the conclusion that biometrics is becoming a common-
place part of society where individuals are willing to relinquish their
right to privacy in their fingerprints, irises, etc. and place them in the
public domain. Although individuals currently cannot purchase biomet-
ric systems to restrict access to their homes, cars or other secured areas,
if the fingerprint flash drives and fingerprint readers sold at CompUSA
are any indication, application of biometric modalities to home security
is on the horizon. Realistically, a court faced with this issue will need to
distinguish between the various forms of biometric modalities and ar-
ticulate which (if any) are so intrusive that their use violates the Fourth
Amendment, just as courts have distinguished between drug tests, blood
tests, fingerprinting and nonconsensual stomach pumping.
40. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (petitioner and 24 other youths were
detained for questioning and fingerprinting in connection with a rape where only a general
description was given and police had obtained a set of the assailant's fingerprints).
41. See Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003).
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For example, if one component of such a system includes a method
identifying individuals according to their gait, the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy would fail the second prong of Justice Harlan's
two-part test.4 In such a case a court's inquiry into the constitutionality
of biometric identification and verification systems would allow the
court to establish some guidelines. Outside of their home, the way in
which an individual walks is typically exposed to the "'plain view' of
outsiders" without manifestation of an intent "to keep [it private]." The
very act of being outside contradicts assertions that the individual retains
an expectation of privacy and a less stringent standard would be re-
quired. An analogy could be drawn to U.S. v. Knotts, where the Supreme
Court held that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in an auto-
mobile because a car that travels on public roads and highways is open
to public scrutiny.43 The defendants did not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy regarding information observable to the public such as move-
ments of a car on public property. Yet, the implication is that anyone who
walks outside automatically gives up their right to privacy in their gait.
Logic, however, tells us that the way one walks is drastically different
from the pattern of blood vessels in one's retina and it is difficult to ex-
trapolate the Dionisio holding (the requirement that witnesses appear
before a grand jury and provide voice prints did not violate the Fourth
Amendment and no preliminary showing of probable cause or reason-
ableness was required in such a case) to a retina or iris, which seems
inherently private.
A court faced with this issue would need to articulate a rule regard-
ing the weight one's expectation of privacy (based upon the type of
physical data involved) should be given. If a sliding scale is used, gait, as
compared with an iris, retinal scan or facial scan (where a court would
likely want to keep the right to privacy intact) would fall on the lower
end of the spectrum. In light of the fact that multi-modal biometric sys-
tems will slowly become more prevalent, it will be imperative for courts
to determine which types of biometric identifiers give rise to an expecta-
tion of privacy consistent with the Katz test," i.e. how "invasive" the
biometric modality is characterized. The issue of invasiveness would
likely be a two-part inquiry taking into consideration what is done to the
suspect's body and how law enforcement officials use the information.
Courts can use this as the foundation from which they can assess the
42. In Katz, Justice Harlan announced a two-part test to be used when assessing an
individual's Fourth Amendment claim. Under the test, a person must have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and the expectation must be one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable."
43. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-282 (1983).
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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public's access to that specific type of technology and begin to develop
standards relevant to biometric technology. Yet, the terrorism context
raises a completely different set of problems.
The rationales articulated above do not extend to an environment
plagued by a fear of terrorist acts against the United States. In this set-
ting, biometrics systems are being used to identify someone who may or
may not commit an act of terrorism once they are on U.S. soil. Williams
and Hayes contemplate circumstances where detainees are stopped on
reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime. However, suspected ter-
rorists will be detained on reasonable suspicion that they might commit a
future crime (unless an outstanding warrant or some other intervening
circumstance requiring arrest is present). 5 Given that national security is
deemed an area best left to the executive branch, police officers and fed-
eral agents will be given more deference when dealing with suspected or
known terrorists. This is the type of setting where law enforcement offi-
cials could use more intrusive scans as a means of identification and
where we would encourage the use of multi-modal systems to heighten
accuracy. Given that federal agencies typically compare the data they
receive when an individual attempts to enter the country with data col-
lected by other domestic and international organizations before allowing
the individual to enter U.S. territory, implementing multi-modal systems
could have the same effect, assuming that the necessary databases be-
sides the AFIS/IAFIS system contain criminal history information.
Taking the multi-layered screening approach and the ongoing "War on
Terror" into consideration, courts are unlikely to second-guess determi-
nations regarding who is allowed entry into the country and who is
denied, in light of the fact that allowing the "wrong" person entry could
have deadly consequences. While detaining suspected terrorists and
other criminals from entering the United States is an important goal, the
problems biometric data poses will not be as difficult to resolve in this
45. See US-VISIT Stops Murderers, Pedophiles and Immigration Violators From Enter-
ing The United States Through Biometrics and International Cooperation, http://
www.findbiometrics.com/article/67 (last visited Feb. 16, 2007) (a Swiss national suspected of
being a pedophile was sent back to France after a fingerprint scan indicated that he was
wanted by Interpol). US-VISIT is a system developed by the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity designed to verify an individual's identify when they attempt to enter the United States in
an effort to facilitate travel while preserving national security. The process typically begins
overseas, at the U.S. consular offices issuing visas, where visitors' biometrics (digital finger-
scans and photographs) are collected and checked against a database of known criminals and
suspected terrorists. When the visitor arrives at the port of entry, the same biometrics are used
to verify that the person at the port is the same individual who received the visa. The US-
VISIT system is currently being tested at many airports and seaports nationwide.
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setting because law enforcement officials are given more latitude where
national security is at stake.4
IV. CABINING BIOMETRICS
The best way for states to establish limits on the use of biometrics is
to legislate or amend their state constitution to provide protections
greater than those encompassed in the Fourth Amendment. States can set
guidelines clarifying when and under what conditions biometric modali-
ties can be used. Moreover, states should require that multi-modal
systems be used to decrease the number of false identifications and false
non-matches. Further, states can legislate so that law enforcement offi-
cials are prohibited from using biometrics systems as their primary
means of identifying and verifying individuals. As Paul Rosenzweig
suggests, biometric systems could be limited to verification or "one-to-
one" matching, where the accuracy is higher. 7 A warrant could be re-
quired for all fingerprint scans or scans deemed to be "intrusive," unless
exigent circumstances exist. The definition of a search could be broad-
ened to address the varying forms of biometric technology or the
offenses for which a police officer can conduct a fingerprint scan could
be narrowly defined.
If biometric modalities are to be used to identify criminals and ter-
rorists, for example, the success of the system will depend upon the
strength of the database that is used. In order for the technology to be
used properly, a criminal must be identified as such in the biometric da-
tabase or must be linked to a criminal history database.48 While the FBI's
IAFIS system is the most comprehensive database among law enforce-
ment organizations, fingerprints alone do not guarantee accuracy. Part of
46. For example, where an individual who has detonated bombs throughout Europe, but
has eluded capture is flagged by Interpol as a suspected terrorist, when that individual at-
tempts to enter the United States, his finger, hand or face could be scanned and the image
would then be cross-referenced with Interpol's and other criminal history databanks. Once the
system recognizes that this individual has been detained as a suspected terrorist, Customs
officials can deny his entry into the country. Given the individual's criminal history and as-
suming that the state of national security was such that entry into the United States was being
restricted due to perceived terrorist threats, few courts would question this act. The rationale
for this deference stems from the view that the Executive Branch is best placed to make deci-
sions concerning national security, not the courts.
47. Paul Rosenzweig & Alane Kochems & Ard Schwartz, Biometric Technologies: Se-
curity, Legal, and Policy Implications, June 21, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/lml2.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
48. In order for the linkage theory to withstand criticism, the criminal history database
must have used the same biometric scans that I have discussed so that when a hand or iris is
scanned, the new template can be cross-referenced with an older one, taken at the time the
individual was detained on suspicion of a crime.
Biometrics
the appeal of biometrics is that the different methods can be layered to
create a multi-modal system. Advocates suggest that this multi-layered
approach be used rather than a single-layer approach to enhance accu-
racy. In addition, if one method should fail, verification and/or
identification can still occur using another layer of the biometric tech-
nology. For these systems to achieve full-scale implementation, other
biometric databases will need to be developed and those who have been
convicted of a crime will need to be flagged within the database. When
one considers the fact that the database of retinal images is very small, it
is unlikely that many of the individuals in the database are flagged as
suspected criminals. However, it might not be long before those booked
at police stations will have their hands and faces scanned. This process
will take time and cabining biometric systems will be difficult until these
systems are put to their best use.
CONCLUSION
Biometric systems are not meant to be treated as the ultimate secu-
rity solution. Legislatures must assess the strengths and weaknesses of
these systems before allowing their full-scale use, especially in light of
the ramifications of a false match. Biometric modalities are best used as
another tool in a layered approach to security that should not be demon-
ized and cast aside without further exploration. The key is to ensure that
the government's infringement on privacy rights corresponds with its
interaction with the individual and that it has the technological tools in
place to achieve this goal. Biometrics differ from beepers, GPS, RFID
chips, and other tracking devices. Whereas these devices allow the gov-
ernment to follow you wherever you go, biometric technology replaces
"you" with a mere algorithm. Rather than watch your every move, law
enforcement officials are unable to determine who "you" are until you
are stopped by a police officer or attempt to access a restricted area.
One cannot avoid technology. Rather than escape it, time must be
spent creating rules and guidelines for how this technology can be used
to achieve legitimate governmental objectives without eradicating the
protections the Fourth Amendment provides. State laws can guide courts
if legislatures opt to address recent technological advances. The Supreme
Court's ruling in Kyllo can be used as a baseline until biometric systems
become a part of our every day lives. If the San Jose Mineta Interna-
tional Airport, Heathrow Airport and the Florida School District are any
indication, we won't be waiting long.
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